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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Defendant Adrian Mastrangelo, Jr., appeals his 
conviction following a jury trial for conspiracy to 
manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 846. He was charged on two counts of a 12-count 
indictment with conspiracy to manufacture 
methamphetamine and attempt to manufacture 
methamphetamine. The jury convicted him of the 
conspiracy charge, and acquitted him of the charge of 
attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Post-trial, 
Mastrangelo moved for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 29(c) or, alternatively, for a new trial 
under Rule 33. The District Court denied both motions. 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 941 F. Supp. 1428, 1443 
(E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
On the acquittal motion, the District Court concluded, 
first, that there was sufficient evidence (viewed in a light 
most favorable to the government) for a jury to conclude 
that defendant was guilty of the conspiracy beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Second, it held that the allegedly 
outrageous conduct of the government in failing to preserve 
evidence did not demonstrate any bad faith, because there 
was no showing that the government knew the exculpatory 
value of the evidence at the time. Third, it concluded that 
the misdeeds of the government, which included allegations 
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of permitting perjured grand jury testimony, were harmless 
errors and did not substantially influence the grand jury's 
decision to indict. 
 
The District Court also rejected each of the seven 
grounds underlying the motion for a new trial. The court 
held Mastrangelo lacked standing to challenge the search of 
the storage locker in which the methamphetamine 
equipment and ingredients were found, and concluded that 
it did not err in admitting into evidence a videotape 
showing defendant opening the storage locker, co- 
conspirators' statements, a stipulation intended to avoid 
the introduction under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 
404(b) of evidence of Mastrangelo's prior conviction for 
methamphetamine manufacture, the laboratory analysis 
showing methamphetamine was present on equipment 
found in the locker but damaged or destroyed before the 
defendant could test the equipment, and photographs of 
other items later destroyed. Finally, the District Court 
determined that prosecutorial misconduct in the closing 
statements and rebuttal either was cured or lacked an 
improper effect on the jury. Thus, the court concluded that 
its earlier refusal to declare a mistrial was not error. 
 
The District Court sentenced Mastrangelo to 262 months' 
imprisonment, the lowest possible on his offense level of 34, 
and ten years' supervised release, but waived thefine. 
Mastrangelo filed a timely appeal. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
There are a number of highly problematic issues raised 
on this appeal. Because of the conclusion we ultimately 
reach on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, we will 
discuss some of the other issues only briefly. 
 
One of the contentions Mastrangelo presses most 
vigorously is that there was insufficient evidence to support 
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the jury's verdict of guilty on the conspiracy charge. In 
order to establish a conspiracy, the prosecution must 
prove: 
 
       (1) a shared "unity of purpose," 
 
       (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and 
 
       (3) an agreement to work together toward the goal. 
 
United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988). 
This proof incorporates a demonstration that a defendant 
has "knowledge of the illegal objective contemplated by the 
conspiracy." Id. at 91. 
 
1. The Evidence Against Mastrangelo 
 
The District Court held there was sufficient evidence of 
Mastrangelo's involvement in the conspiracy to 
manufacture methamphetamine based on the following 
evidence, which was detailed in the District Court's opinion. 
 
Michael DeJulius, Raymond D'Aulerio, and Adrian 
Mastrangelo, III (Adrian III), defendant's son, pled guilty to 
conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 
methamphetamine from approximately July 30 to October 
4, 1993. Paul Rosa, a cooperating witness who acted for the 
government, sought to purchase methamphetamine from 
DeJulius and D'Aulerio, but they lacked methylamine, a 
necessary ingredient. In what the District Court 
characterized as a "reverse sting"1  organized by the 
government, Rosa gave DeJulius the methylamine on 
August 5 in four bottles in a white box with the name "J.T. 
Baker," a chemical supply company, on the side of the box. 
This name became the basis by which the government 
could identify the box. DeJulius gave the box to a second 
person who gave it to Adrian III, who, in turn, brought it to 
"Garage G," a garage on Latona Street in Philadelphia. 
Several hours later, Adrian III returned to get"what 
appeared to be the box" and moved it to his own house 
nearby. Mastrangelo, 941 F. Supp. at 1431. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The current United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual describes a 
"reverse sting" as "an operation in which the government sells a 
controlled substance to a defendant." U.S.S.G.S 2D1.1, comment. (n.15). 
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On August 7, Mastrangelo, driving his own Jeep, went to 
his son's house, and minutes later the two left with Adrian 
III driving the Jeep and Mastrangelo driving a white van. 
They drove to another location in the same neighborhood 
where they loaded various items into and out of the van. 
Thereafter, they switched vehicles with Adrian III driving 
the van and Mastrangelo driving the Jeep, and drove back 
to Garage G, where they moved various items into, and 
possibly out of, the van. Id. 
 
The two then drove on I-95, a north-south expressway, to 
a storage facility in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Along the way 
they exited and reentered the highway once and exchanged 
the lead a few times, but they always drove within the 
speed limit, in what the District Court, based on trial 
testimony, stated might have been a counter-surveillance 
measure. After they left the highway, Mastrangelo parked 
the Jeep at a nearby apartment complex and joined his son 
in the van before they drove to the storage facility. They 
punched the security-gate code at the entrance to the 
facility, using what company records showed was the code 
for storage locker H-16, remained for five minutes, and 
then drove both vehicles back to Philadelphia. Id. 
 
The storage locker H-16 was rented in the name of 
someone who has not been located. The address listed on 
the rental lease, however, was for an apartment in the 
complex where Mastrangelo lived. The contact phone 
number listed on the lease was for a phone located at an 
address where Mastrangelo had previously lived and at 
which two automobiles were still registered to him. A 
handwriting expert testified that the lease for the locker 
was probably signed by Mastrangelo and the locker rental 
agent testified that the renter was approximately the same 
height, age, and hair color as Mastrangelo, but neither 
witness's testimony was unequivocal. Id. at 1432. 
 
Although the government maintained surveillance at the 
storage facility, company records revealed that someone, 
without the government's knowledge, used the security 
code for locker H-16 on August 8 to enter the facility and 
remained about ten minutes. Thereafter, the government 
covertly searched locker H-16 on August 25 and found the 
J.T. Baker box, some ingredients and equipment necessary 
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for manufacturing methamphetamine, and one of the 
marked bottles, now empty, with a residue of methylamine. 
The government photographed the contents of the locker 
before returning everything to its original state. Later, on 
September 17, it seized all the drug-related materials from 
the locker. Among the items seized were ingredients and 
equipment necessary to make methamphetamine except for 
phenyl-2-propanone, the most expensive ingredient, and 
methylamine. Adrian III's fingerprint was on the 
methylamine bottle. Mastrangelo's fingerprint was on a 
funnel but there is no way to know the date when the 
fingerprint was made. A government agent stated that it 
was common to store some of the materials in separate 
places and opined that whoever controlled the locker was 
either the financier or the "cook." Id.  
 
On October 4, the government executed search warrants 
for the residences of DeJulius, D'Aulerio, and Adrian III, as 
well as for Garage G. Documents belonging to Mastrangelo 
and Adrian III and an old catalogue for chemical supplies 
were found at the garage. Id. 
 
On October 7, Mastrangelo went to the storage locker, 
which was now empty except for some domestic items, 
removed the padlocks, and abandoned the locker and the 
few remaining items. He also transferred the title for his 
Jeep to his girlfriend, and reregistered a truck he had 
previously purchased to another person, although he was 
still using the truck a year and a half later. The storage 
company attempted unsuccessfully to contact someone 
associated with the locker rental: one contact telephone 
number was disconnected and the person at the other 
could not explain why his number was used on the lease. 
Mastrangelo was arrested at his sister's house more than a 
year and a half later. Id. at 1432-33. 
 
2. The District Court's Analysis of the Evidence 
 
The District Court concluded that the circumstantial 
evidence supported the inference that Mastrangelo knew 
what materials were in H-16. The court referred to the two- 
vehicle trip to the storage locker in August as one 
transporting the methylamine, id. at 1434. 
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The District Court concluded that the jury could have 
inferred that Mastrangelo "facilitated the goals of the 
conspiracy by allowing materials which he knew were for 
the manufacture of methamphetamine to be stored in[the] 
locker over which he had control during the life of the 
conspiracy." Id. at 1434. The court held that the jury could 
have found that Mastrangelo controlled the locker because 
of the testimony of the handwriting expert and the rental 
agent, together with evidence that the misinformation on 
the lease appeared designed to hide the identity of the 
actual lessee. Id. Finally, the District Court took evidence 
that Mastrangelo fled after discovering the empty locker 
and transferred certain assets, such as the vehicles, as 
proof of Mastrangelo's guilt. 
 
3. This Court's Precedents 
 
In several prior cases, this court has overturned 
convictions for conspiracy in drug possession and 
distribution because of the absence of any evidence that the 
defendant had knowledge that drugs were involved. In 
Wexler, 838 F.2d at 90-92, we reversed the defendant's 
conviction because there was no evidence that the 
defendant, who acted as a lookout and spoke with some of 
the conspirators, knew what was behind the closed doors of 
a truck that contained drugs. Although we believed that 
Wexler probably suspected "that some form of contraband 
was involved," that suspicion was insufficient to prove 
knowledge of the conspiracy's objective. Accord United 
States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing 
conviction because there was no proof that defendant, who 
rode cross-country in truck, knew locked compartment 
contained drugs). In United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 
1106 (3d Cir. 1991), there was evidence that the defendant 
performed surveillance, possessed surveillance equipment, 
spoke to the conspirators, and opened the trunk of a car 
from which the government contended a wrapped package 
was removed. Id. at 1113-15. After comparing the case to 
Wexler, we held the evidence insufficient to show that the 
defendant knew what was in the package, declining the 
government's invitation to rule that the defendant's 
suspicious movements near the trunk were sufficient to 
support the conviction. Id. 
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More recently, in United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403 
(3d Cir. 1997), we held that the prosecution had failed to 
prove that the defendant, who, in exchange for $500, went 
to a hotel room to see whether the room contained a 
suitcase, knew the suitcase contained drugs. There was 
evidence that several calls were made from a conspirator's 
phone to the defendant's home, pager, and cell phone, but 
no evidence that the defendant knew any of the 
conspirators. We concluded that the government had 
shown that the defendant knew his activities were illegal, 
but not that he knew drugs were involved. 
 
And in United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 
1998), we held there was insufficient evidence to convict a 
defendant who arrived in a car with one of the participants, 
was present during several conversations among the 
conspirators, owned and carried the bag containing the 
money, and knew that the money was to buy something 
that would fit into a suitcase, because there was no 
evidence that any of the conspirators ever mentioned illegal 
drugs in the defendant's presence. But see United States v. 
Touby. 909 F.2d 759, 771-72 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding 
conviction based on evidence that defendant received boxes 
containing necessary chemical ingredients to make drugs 
and that recipes and a laboratory for making the drugs 
were found in her marital bedroom), aff 'd on other grounds, 
500 U.S. 160 (1991)). 
 
At oral argument, the government sought to distinguish 
these cases from the one against Mastrangelo and, 
methodically reviewing the evidence it presented, step by 
step, piece by piece, made a vigorous argument that the 
evidence here was sufficient to sustain Mastrangelo's 
conviction. Although the evidence against Mastrangelo was 
indirect, we believe that it was sufficient to permit the 
District Court to send the case to the jury. The other cases 
where we overturned the defendants' convictions involved 
charges of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance 
(often cocaine) and the missing ingredient was the 
defendants' knowledge of the substance. Here, however, 
Mastrangelo is charged with conspiracy to manufacture 
methamphetamine, which is more like the conspiracy to 
manufacture scenario presented by our decision in Touby, 
 
                                8 
  
909 F.2d at 771-72. There, the wife defendant had argued 
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding 
of her guilt because there was no direct evidence of the 
manufacture of the controlled substance. We held that 
evidence of chemicals, recipes for the manufacturing 
process, and a laboratory in the marital bedroom was 
sufficient, although circumstantial, to permit the jury to 
infer that she had the requisite knowledge, despite her 
assertion that the chemical ingredients were only for a T- 
shirt business. 
 
Here, the government presented evidence, albeit slim and 
circumstantial, from which the jury could infer that 
Mastrangelo saw the boxes with the relevant equipment 
and ingredients in the storage locker, joined with Adrian III, 
a co-conspirator, to travel surreptitiously to the storage 
locker, where the government subsequently found many of 
the ingredients to manufacture methamphetamine, and had 
control of that locker. Together with the Stipulation that 
Mastrangelo had the chemical background to know the 
equipment and ingredients necessary to make 
methamphetamine, and the requirement that we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as 
the verdict winner, this evidence is sufficient, but 
concededly barely, to support a jury's inference as to 
Mastrangelo's connection to the illegal conspiracy to 
manufacture that was at the heart of the government's 
case. Nonetheless, the slimness of the evidence is relevant 
to our ultimate disposition. 
 
B. 
 
RULE 404(b): PRIOR CRIMES EVIDENCE 
 
The government sought to introduce evidence that 
Mastrangelo was convicted in federal court in 1984 of 
conspiracy to manufacture, to possess with intent to 
distribute, and to distribute methamphetamine, and in 
state court in the same year. The District Court rejected the 
government's effort to introduce evidence of the state 
conviction but granted its motion as to evidence of the 
federal crime. To avoid the prejudicial effect of the 
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government's introducing evidence of the prior crime, the 
defendant agreed to stipulate that he "had the chemical 
background to know the ingredients and equipment 
necessary to make methamphetamine."  Supp. App. at 822- 
23. See United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272-75 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (approving use of stipulations to avoid prejudice 
flowing from admission of prior crimes evidence). To ensure 
that the Stipulation was voluntary, see United States v. 
Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 1988), the District 
Court asked the defendant to take the stand and confirm 
that he understood the Stipulation and that acceptance 
was voluntary, which the defendant did. Supp. App. at 830- 
33. Thereafter, the District Court advised the jury of the 
Stipulation and did not admit evidence of the 1984 
conviction. 
 
Ordinarily, defendant's agreement to the Stipulation, on 
the informed advice of counsel, would preclude any 
objection on appeal. Here, Mastrangelo argues that the 
Stipulation was induced by the District Court's erroneous 
ruling that Mastrangelo's prior crime was admissible. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that admissibility under 
FRE 404(b) requires: (1) a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) 
relevance under FRE 402; (3) a weighing of the probative 
value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect under 
FRE 403; and (4) a limiting instruction concerning the 
purpose for which the evidence may be used. See 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988), 
cited in United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d 
Cir. 1992). The admission of prior crimes evidence under 
Rule 404(b) is a matter for the District Court's discretion, 
provided that the court explains how the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; if such an 
explanation is lacking, and the record does not clearly 
support the finding of probative value, the court of appeals 
will do the balancing itself. United States v. Himelwright, 42 
F.3d 777, 781, (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
To meet the first requirement and show a proper 
evidentiary purpose, the government must "clearly 
articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical 
inferences" without adverting to a mere propensity to 
commit crime now based on the commission of crime then. 
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Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887. The government sought to 
admit the evidence of Mastrangelo's prior conviction to 
show Mastrangelo knew of the conspiracy's objectives and 
intended to participate therein, but could not easily 
articulate a chain of logical inferences that would have 
made the prior crime evidence relevant to those issues. 
Ultimately, the District Court stated that it would admit 
evidence of the federal crime for purposes of proving 
knowledge but not to show intent. Supp. App. at 723. 
 
The court determined that the second requirement, 
relevance, was met because the prior conviction established 
that Mastrangelo knew that the materials found in the 
storage locker could be assembled to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
 
On the third prong, the court summarily stated that the 
probative value outweighs the prejudice to Mastrangelo, 
despite defense counsel's repeated assertions that the 
government could establish Mastrangelo's knowledge of the 
ingredients and equipment through alternate means. 
 
Finally, on the fourth prong, the District Court declined 
to provide a limiting instruction concerning the stipulation 
although it would have been obligated to provide such an 
instruction had it admitted evidence of the prior crime 
itself. 
 
We review the District Court's determination on the 
admissibility of the evidence under the usual standard of 
abuse of discretion. Although there may have been 
adequate bases for the District Court's findings concerning 
three of the four prongs, the failure of the District Court to 
provide a clear explanation regarding the balance between 
the evidence's prejudicial and probative effects is troubling, 
particularly because the Stipulation plays an important 
part in our analysis of the alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct. However, we need not decide whether the 
court erred in holding the government could introduce 
evidence of Mastrangelo's prior crime because we believe 
another issue is dispositive. 
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C. 
 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS  
 
It will be recalled that the Stipulation was a limited one: 
Mastrangelo "had the chemical background to know the 
ingredients and equipment necessary to make 
methamphetamine." Significantly, Mastrangelo did not 
stipulate that he knew how to make methamphetamine. 
The difference is important. In fact, the District Court 
refused the prosecutor's request that the Stipulation 
contain language that Mastrangelo knew the process 
needed to manufacture methamphetamine. App. at 634a1- 
634a2. 
 
Mastrangelo argues that the prosecutor's statements 
regarding the Stipulation made in her closing and rebuttal 
arguments went beyond the parameters of the Stipulation 
itself. Mastrangelo focuses on a number of specific remarks. 
 
In the first statement at issue, the prosecutor stated: 
 
       When I opened . . . I told you what I was going to prove 
       and I said [that] there will be more. And what more did 
       I prove to you? The stipulation. The defendant has the 
       chemical background to know the ingredients and 
       equipment necessary to make methamphetamine. 
 
       There is no evidence concerning anyone else involved in 
       this conspiracy whether known or unknown. 
 
App. at 732 (emphasis added). Mastrangelo's counsel 
objected, and the district court sustained counsel's 
objection but refused to order a mistrial. App. at 732. 
 
Moments later, the prosecutor directly mischaracterized 
the Stipulation, remarking, "[T]he defendant knew, based 
upon that stipulation, I submit to you how to make 
methamphetamine. I believe that is clear." App. at 732. 
 
Later, in the prosecutor's closing statement, the 
prosecutor again misrepresented the Stipulation, stating 
that Mastrangelo "had the knowledge, the knowledge to 
either make it--make the methamphetamine  or to tell 
someone else how to make it." App. at 735 (emphasis 
added). Then, the prosecutor argued: 
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       That combined with the stipulation of knowledge, I 
       would submit to you shows that the defendant passed 
       the stage of just thinking about committing a crime 
       and form[ed] the actual intent to do that crime, to 
       manufacture methamphetamine. 
 
App. at 736. The defense again moved for a mistrial, and 
again the District Court denied the motion. 
 
The impropriety of these statements is evident. They 
distort the substance of the Stipulation, inflating the 
limited stipulation that Mastrangelo had the chemical 
background to know the ingredients and equipment 
necessary to make methamphetamine to encompass a 
meaning that the District Court had previously ruled 
unwarranted, i.e., that because of his knowledge of the 
ingredients and equipment needed, Mastrangelo knew how 
to make methamphetamine. Furthermore, the prosecutor's 
statement that there was no evidence that anyone else had 
similar knowledge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 
to Mastrangelo to demonstrate that one of the other 
conspirators knew how to make methamphetamine. 
 
The District Court agreed that the prosecutor's 
statements improperly shifted the burden to the defendant, 
and discussed giving a curative instruction, but allowed the 
jury to go to lunch before giving one. After the jury returned 
and before the defendant's closing argument, the court gave 
the following curative instruction regarding the Stipulation: 
 
       The parties stipulated that the defendant had the 
       chemical background to make methamphetamine. The 
       Government, Ms. Howard, in its closing made reference 
       to the fact [that] there was no evidence presented that 
       anyone else had this chemical background and that 
       therefore by inference the defendant, since he 
       possessed this knowledge, must necessarily have been 
       the maker. 
 
       Such an inference is improper and should be stricken 
       from your minds. There was no burden on the defense 
       to produce evidence that no one else did or did 
       not possess chemical knowledge to make 
       methamphetamine. 
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       Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case that no 
       one else did not have the knowledge to make 
       methamphetamine. 
 
App. at 747-48 (emphasis added). Ironically, the court's 
statement in the curative instruction that the defendant 
"had the chemical background to make methamphetamine" 
misstated the Stipulation and repeated one of the 
prosecutor's misstatements, thereby compounding the 
error. 
 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor once again improperly equated 
the chemical background to know the ingredients and 
equipment necessary to make methamphetamine and the 
knowledge of how to make methamphetamine, when she 
said: 
 
       [T]hat's the difference between your knowing now what 
       the ingredients are and how to make a cake, than 
       someone who had the chemical background to know 
       the ingredients and equipment necessary. 
 
App. at 749 (emphasis added). The analogy is a poor one. 
A child or a spouse may go to the store to buy the 
ingredients to make a cake but not know what to do with 
them once in the kitchen. The District Court sustained the 
defense objection after which the following revealing sidebar 
discussion took place: 
 
       MS. HOWARD:  Just -- I really don't get this one. 
 
       THE COURT:  I know you don't. 
 
       MS. HOWARD:  I do apologize. 
 
       THE COURT:  I know you really don't get it. 
 
       MS. HOWARD:  I really don't. 
 
       THE COURT:  You don't get it. 
 
       MS. HOWARD:  Okay. 
 
       THE COURT:  You don't get it. 
 
       MR. PATRIZIO:  Defendant moves for a mistrial. 
 
       THE COURT:  I'm considering it. 
 
       MS. HOWARD:  Judge -- 
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       THE COURT:  I'm considering it. 
 
       MS. HOWARD:  -- would you explain to me? I don't 
       get it. 
 
App. at 750. Apparently, the prosecutor did not recognize 
the difference between having the chemical background to 
know the ingredients and equipment needed to make 
methamphetamine and knowing the process to make the 
drug. 
 
Many of the cases dealing with improper prosecutorial 
comments have arisen in the context of prosecutorial 
vouching but the legal issues are equally applicable here. In 
deciding whether the prosecution has improperly 
commented at trial, the court should look to the overall 
context of the statements in the trial record. United States 
v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Improper prosecutorial 
comments may lead the jury to infer that the prosecutor 
knows undisclosed facts which she could not present to the 
jury. See United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 186 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
Review of the legal standard enunciated in a jury 
instruction is plenary, see United States v. Johnstone, 107 
F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1997), but review of the wording of 
the instruction, i.e., the expression, is for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 
(3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). If we conclude that a comment 
was improper, we must apply a harmless error analysis, 
looking to see if "it is highly probable that the error did not 
contribute to the judgment." Id. at 1265 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The high probability standard is met when 
the court possesses a "sure conviction" that the error did 
not prejudice a defendant. Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
We have looked to three factors to determine whether 
there was prejudice: the scope of the improper comments in 
the overall trial context, the effect of any curative 
instructions given, and the strength of the evidence against 
the defendant. Id. Turning first to the place of the improper 
comments in the context of this case, we must conclude 
that they were central. The prosecution sought to have the 
jury infer that Mastrangelo was the "cook," that is, the 
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individual who actually turned the ingredients into 
methamphetamine, but it had no evidence, direct or 
indirect, of that fact. If the prosecutor could convince the 
jury that Mastrangelo was the only conspirator who knew 
how to make methamphetamine, the jury might reasonably 
draw that inference. However, there was no evidence that 
Mastrangelo knew how to make methamphetamine, and it 
was highly improper, whether intentionally or inadvertently, 
to shift the meaning of the Stipulation to fill in that missing 
link.2 
 
Arguably, a clear and forceful curative instruction from 
the District Court might have cured the potentially 
devastating effect of the prosecutor's misrepresentations. In 
this case, unfortunately, the District Court itself misstated 
the content of the Stipulation, which, even if it did not 
further confuse the jury, certainly did not effect a cure. 
 
Finally, as we discussed above, this is not a case where 
the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Quite the contrary. 
The only conspirator whom the government could show 
Mastrangelo knew and contacted was his own son. There is 
no direct proof that Mastrangelo actually went to the locker 
on August 7. Moreover, even if he went to the locker on 
that day there is no direct proof that he saw the same 
contents that the government photographed on August 25 
(its first access to the locker) because the person who 
entered the facility on August 8 using the code for locker H- 
16 and who remained there for ten minutes may have 
placed some or all of the potentially incriminating material 
in that locker. Similarly, there is no direct proof that 
Mastrangelo assisted in transporting to the storage locker 
the methylamine provided through the government. The 
government agents lost surveillance of the bottles at some 
point after the initial controlled delivery. The government 
conceded that it was unable to maintain an uninterrupted 
view of the various homes and garages involved. Finally, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At oral argument, the government suggested that the Stipulation was 
used only in connection with the attempt charge. The record shows 
otherwise. See Trial Tr. April 17, 1996 at 66 (prosecutor refers to 
contents of Stipulation as part of the evidence that showed that 
Mastrangelo "was willfully a part of the conspiracy."). 
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there is no direct evidence that Mastrangelo had any 
knowledge of the conspiracy's plan to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
 
Although we concluded earlier that the jury could have 
cumulated the permissible inferences to find sufficient 
evidence to convict Mastrangelo of participation in the 
conspiracy, there was no evidence, absent the prosecutorial 
misstatements and the faulty curative instruction 
improperly extending the Stipulation, from which the jury 
could have inferred that Mastrangelo knew how to make 
methamphetamine. Therefore, in this pivotal context, the 
misstatements dramatically enhanced Mastrangelo's alleged 
role in the conspiracy without supporting evidence. 
 
The Stipulation was therefore crucial. The government's 
repeated misrepresentations of that stipulation and the 
faulty curative instruction, when considered under the 
required analysis, were not harmless. We cannot possess a 
"sure conviction" that these errors regarding the Stipulation 
did not prejudice Mastrangelo and have significant effect on 
the jury's decision.3 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will reverse the order of the 
District Court denying defendant's motion for acquittal or, 
in the alternative, a new trial, and will remand for a new 
trial. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In light of our holding, we need not consider the other errors 
Mastrangelo raises in his brief. 
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